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Abstract 
This paper considers a partial equilibrium model of conflict where two 
asymmetric, rational and risk-neutral opponents evaluate differently the 
contested stake. Differently from common contest models, agents have the 
option of choosing a second instrument to affect the outcome of the 
conflict. The second instrument is assumed to capture positive investments 
in ‘conflict management’ - labelled as ‘talks’. It will be demonstrated that, 
under some conditions, an asymmetry in the evaluation of the stake can 
lead to a concession from one agent to the other. In particular, the agent 
with the higher evaluation of the stake would make a concession, 
proportional to the optimal choice of ‘talks’ . The existence of a concession 
paves the way for establishing a feasible settlement region (FSR) given 
that both parties can be  better off while expending resources in ‘talks’. 
Eventually the basic model is extended in order to consider the existence of 
asymmetries in technological capabilities. Whenever the agents exhibit 
sufficiently asymmetric productive characteristics a FSR can be 
established even if a concession is not ensured. However a concession can 
enlarge the FSR. Finally, throughout the paper, the concept of entropy is 
applied as a tool for the measurement and evaluation of conflict and 
conflict management. 
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A MODEL OF CONFLICT AND CONFLICT MANAGEMENT WITH ASYMMETRIC 
STAKES 
 
(THE GOOD-COP AND THE BAD-COP GAME, PART II) 
 
 
1. Basic Ideas and Cornerstones 
 
Most conflicts involve remarkable bargaining efforts between the 
antagonists. Beyond violence, as applied when sending actual or potential 
threats, agents use to apply other instruments to successfully end any 
contest. During a war, for example, the exploitation of actual violence is 
often interlinked with diplomatic efforts. Diplomatic negotiations are often 
conducted while troops are deployed on the battlefield. In international 
interactions, the exploitation of potential or actual violence cannot be 
disentangled from partial openings and cooperative behaviours.  
  A story which immediately recalls this simple intuition  is the story of 
The Good-Cop and Bad-Cop Game. Consider two cops arresting a suspect. 
Imagine also that they lack sufficient evidence to convict him. Then, they 
have to spend efforts in order to induce prisoner to confess. Next, as usually 
happens in American movies, in the questioning room cops have to play the 
good-cop and bad-cop game. The bad cop has to appear more aggressive, 
rude and less conciliatory. He would send exactly what students of strategy 
would define a ‘credible threat’. On the other hand, the good cop has to 
appear less rude and more conciliatory expounding the advantages of 
confessing. The Cops’ dilemma will be how much efforts in both behaviours 
should be spent. Of course, the outcome of questioning will depend upon 
the interdependent impact of complement instruments, rudeness and 
persuasion. On the other hand, the suspect has to choose whether to confess 
(cooperating through partial openings ) or to stick to his presumption of 
innocence.  
 This story can be simply considered as a conflict. A conflict 
interaction involves interdependent decisions in the presence of coercion 
and anarchy. By coercion, I intend that kind of behaviour that is shaped and 
influenced by the existence of a threat. The importance of threat has been 
brilliantly expounded first by Thomas Schelling (1960/1966) and Kenneth 
Boulding (1963). The existence of a threat recalls the idea of deterrence and 
sheds light on a characteristic feature of conflict – namely, that while 
involved in a conflict the choices of an agent are choices made under 
coercion. Even though agents have options to make a choice, this is not 
purely voluntary.1  
                                                 
1Of course, if one had to develop this idea, it would be useful to single out exactly 
what is ‘voluntary’ and what is ‘coercive’, but this goes far beyond the aim of this 
paper. Basu (2006) deals with the distinction between Coercion and 
Voluntariness. To expound the concept, he provides a brilliant example drawn 
from his own life: […] In 1971 when I was a student in Delhi I was mugged at 
knife point one winter evening on the Delhi University campus. Three men in   4
In recent economic literature, Jack Hirshleifer pioneered the work on 
modelling conflict, whose foundations are in Hirshleifer (1987a, 1988, 
1989). The economic theory of conflict2 rests to a large extent upon the 
assumption that agents involved in conflict interactions have to choose an 
optimal level of efforts or resources devoted to the unproductive activity of 
conflict. A significant element in economic theory of conflict is that 
investing resources in conflict is necessarily detrimental for welfare. This is 
central to the theory of conflict as well as to the theory of rent-seeking and 
contests. Given the partial-equilibrium framework adopted in this work, the 
analysis produced can be generalized to all these theoretical categories. In 
the spirit of the definition provided by Bhagwati (1982), who proposes a 
general taxonomy for a broader range of economic activities representing 
ways of making profit in spite of being directly unproductive, conflicts, 
contests and rent-seeking can be considered directly unproductive activities 
(DUP). According to this view, such activities yield pecuniary returns but do 
not produce goods and services which enter a utility function, either directly 
or indirectly through increased production or availability to the economy of 
goods that enter a utility function. This is the rationale behind the label of 
directly unproductive profit-seeking activities (DUP). 
What is mainly outlined in recent literature is that while conflict 
models are usually general equilibrium models, rent-seeking, and contest 
models are partial equilibrium models. This means that conflict models 
should involve a trade-off between productive and unproductive activities 
and the prize (or the rent) of the contest is endogenous. The stake of the 
conflict is interpreted as a joint production which depends on the 
productive efforts of the agents. At the same time, the cost function is 
represented by the foregone production. In such a construction the greater 
the number of the agents, the greater the ‘pie’ to be split. In rent-seeking 
and contest models, the prize (or the rent) is given exogenously. In such a 
case, even if the number of contestants becomes larger, the rent does not 
change. Moreover, rent-seeking and contest models can involve 
                                                                                                                                         
shawls came up to me on an ill-lit road, and one of them whipped out a knife and 
asked me for my watch. It took me a few seconds to decide what I should do. I 
took off my watch and handed it over to the man with the knife (somehow I seem 
to recall I thanked him) and walked back to my dorm. The question is: Did I part 
with my watch voluntarily or under coercion? Clearly, everybody will agree that 
this is coercion. If this is not coercion, then pretty much nothing is. But notice that 
this was not a situation of no choice. When the man pointed the knife at me and 
asked for my watch, he was giving me a choice: I could give him my watch or my 
life. I chose to keep my life. In fact, it was a bargain since mine was a cheap, 
unreliable watch. So having a choice cannot be equated with noncoercion.[…] 
2 In more recent years several studies extended Hirshleifer’s basic model. See 
among others: Grossman (1991/1998), Skaperdas (1992), Garfinkel (1990/1994), 
Grossman and Kim (1995), Skaperdas and Syropoulos (1996), Neary (1997a), 
Anderton et al. (1999), Anderton (1999/2000), Garfinkel and Skaperdas (2000), 
Alesina and Spolaore (2003/2005), Dixit (2004), Spolaore (2004), Caruso 
(2006b). This growing literature has been r e c e n t l y  s u r v e y e d  i n  G a r f i n k e l  a n d  
Skaperdas (2006).   5
unconstrained optimization, whereas conflict models necessarily imply 
constrained optimization. Neary (1997b) and Hausken (2005) propose a 
comparison of conflict and contest models along these lines. 
This paper presents a partial equilibrium model of conflict featuring 
two asymmetric, rational and risk-neutral opponents. It is intended to 
develop the literature on conflict by tackling three main points: 
 
(i) the existence of a second type of effort (instrument) to win the 
conflict;  
(ii) an asymmetry in the evaluation of the stake of the conflict; 
(iii) the existence of a concession to favour an agreement between 
agents. 
 
In particular note that the definition of conflict interaction given 
above has notable formal implications for this work.  
First, as noted above, the existence of coercion shapes and influences 
agents’ behaviour. This, clearly, marks a difference from rent-seeking and 
contests. Needless to say, in rent-seeking activities, an interest group can 
voluntarily choose whether or not to participate into the competition for 
public funds. In a sport contest – e.g. a race – an athlete can decide not to 
start. By contrast, a conflict interaction is not a voluntary choice. Agents 
have to participate into it and cannot give up. Of course, this assumption 
does exclude the possibility of escape. In formal terms, what is needed is an 
appropriate mathematical function which does not allow for zero efforts in 
conflict. This implies that equilibria where agents do not spend efforts and 
resources in conflict interaction will not be allowed. This assumption does 
constitute a precise choice and partly contrasts with the existing literature. 
The economic theory of conflict takes as a cornerstone the Contest Success 
Function (hereafter CSF for brevity). 3The CSF is a mathematical relation 
that links the outcome of a contest and the efforts of the players. It 
summarises the relevant aspects of what Hirshleifer defines the technology 
of conflict. In particular, the outcome for one agent is decreasing in the 
efforts of other agents. There are two functional forms of CSF adopted in 
literature: the ratio form and the logistic form. Hirshleifer (1989), Baik 
(1998) and Anderton (2000) analyse the different impact of these two 
different functional forms for CSF. In the first case, the outcome depends 
upon the ratio of the efforts applied, whilst in the second case it depends 
upon the difference between the efforts committed. The main difference 
between the two functional forms of CSF becomes clear when one agent, say 
agent 1, puts zero in conflict effort. 
In the simplest two-agents case, let  ( ) , iij p zz denote the probability of 
winning the contest (or alternatively the fraction of the stake) for agent 
                                                 
3 Selective seminal contributions are by Tullock (1980), O’Keeffe et al. (1984) and 
Rosen (1986). Dixit (1987) develops a general framework for contests using the 
general properties of logit functions. See then Skaperdas (1996) and Clark and Riis 
(1998) for a basic axiomatization. See also Amegashie (2006).   6
i with  ,, 1 , 2 , ij zzi i j =≠ indicating the efforts. The probability of winning of 
agent i  is increasing in agent i ’s efforts and decreasing in the efforts of the 
other agent. The ratio form of the CSF implies that if one of the two 
contestants does not exert any positive efforts, the other grabs all the 
contested stake, namely  ) , 0 ( , 1 ) 0 , ( ∞ ∈ ∀ = i i i z z p . By contrast, using the 
logistic form, an agent committing zero effort can achieve some degree of 
success. If peace and cooperation have to be defined as the absence of 
violent efforts (with  0 ij zz == ), peace can never occur as an equilibrium 
under the ratio form of CSF, because either agent would be likely to defect 
and invest any small positive magnitude in order to raise its fraction of the 
stake to 100%. Then, the choice of ratio form of the CSF is consistent with 
the assumption of coercion as a characteristic feature of conflict. Under 
coercion and credible threat one agent can choose the optimal level of 
conflict efforts but cannot give up its own irreversible investment. The 
existence of threat would not allow for the logistic form of CSF.  
The second characteristic feature of conflict is anarchy. By ‘anarchy’ I 
simply mean the absence of rules, norms and institutions governing agents’ 
behaviour. This implies that conflict can be managed and solved only in the 
presence of endogenous ‘rules-of-the-game’ governing the interaction. It 
will be shown that endogenous concessions can constitute an integrative 
mechanism leading to an equilibrium. This does not mean that a mediator, 
a court or an existing and legitimate institution cannot play any role in 
managing and solving conflicts. It means that in presence of anarchy only 
endogenous commitment are assumed to be credible and self-enforcing. 
Then, it also could favour a settlement. Broadly speaking, an unilateral 
concession will be considered as a self-enforcing constraint. 
As presented above, the aim of this paper is that of studying a conflict 
between two risk-neutral agents that evaluate differently the stake and that 
can use different instruments in order to pursue their own maximum utility. 
Therefore, the outcome of the contest will arise from the interaction of such 
different instruments. In this view, the standard one-instrument models 
commonly adopted in literature can be considered as a special case of 
multi-instruments models. 
Therefore, the limiting assumption of this paper is that once involved 
in conflict interactions, agents face the option of choosing also a second 
instrument in order to improve the outcome of the conflict. Thus, in the 
continuation of this work I will interpret the second instrument in a broad 
view. It is assumed to capture the vast majority of potential conflict 
management efforts. In reality, It can take different shapes. It can involve, 
among others, elements of communication, negotiation and signalling. 
Under the assumption of complete information, the second instrument 
must be perfectly observable. Thus to summarise,  
 
(i) the use of a second instrument needs not to be “payoff-irrelevant”: 
it must have a direct impact on both agents’ payoffs;   7
(ii) the second instrument must also be costly. There is no room for 
cheap talk. In fact, what is needed is a “credibility-cost”. Under the 
assumption of complete information, an observable costly effort is 
also assumed to be credible; 
(iii) investment in conflict management must be irrevocable; 
(iv) the two instruments must be complements. 
 
In the theory of contest the use of a second instrument is not a novelty, 
although such approach has not been developed extensively.4 In particular, 
this paper is close to a model proposed by Epstein and Hefeker (2003), who 
model a contest where, the use of a second indtrument creates an advantage 
for the player with the higher stake.  
It must be underlined that the two instruments are intended to be 
complements. In fact, it is reasonable to assume that the outcome of a 
conflict depends upon the mixed effect of violence and negotiation. This 
means that opponents do no give up their willingness to pursue the 
maximum possible payoff. This is in line with the approach presented by 
Genicot and Skaperdas (2002), who present a general equilibrium model of 
conflict with investment in conflict management.  
Henceforth, for expository convenience, in the continuation of the 
work I shall refer to the second instrument as ‘‘talks’’ whereas the first 
instrument will be indicated through the traditional ‘‘guns’’.5  
Eventually, another goal of this paper will be represented by the 
identification of a Feasible Settlement Region (henceforth FSR for sake of 
brevity) as the set of possible peaceful agreements. The limiting hypothesis 
is that a settlement region is feasible if and only if both agents choose to 
expend positive efforts in the second instrument, namely in ‘‘talks’’. At the 
same time, a FSR must be an incentive-compatible structure. Both agents 
have to be better off under a FSR. To summarise formally, henceforth let 
                                                 
4 Baik and Shogran (1995) study a contest between players with unknown relative 
ability. Under the assumption of decreasing aversion to uncertain ability, agents 
are allowed to expend resources in order to reduce such uncertainty through 
spying. Konrad (2003) enriches a model of rent-seeking considering the 
interaction between two types of efforts: (i) the standard rent-seeking efforts to 
improve their own performance in the view of winning a prize; (ii) a sabotaging 
effort in order to reduce the effectiveness of other agents’ efforts. In this model, 
sabotage is targeted towards a particular rival group and reduces this group’s 
performance. The point of interest is that through sabotage a group can increase 
its own probability of winning the prize as well as the other contestants’. Thus, the 
model predicts that sabotage disappears whenever the number of contestants 
becomes large. Caruso (2005b) presents two different models of contest with two 
instruments. The analysis is applied to sport contests in order to consider the 
phenomena of match-fixing and doping. Arbatskaya and Mialon (2005) analyse in 
depth the equilibrium properties of a two-instruments contest model and compare 
the results to those attainable in standard one-instrument models. 
5 Of course, being in a partial equilibrium framework the classical tradeoff between 
‘butter’ and ‘‘guns’’ is not considered.       8
,1 , 2 i hi =  denote the investments in ‘talks’ and let  ,1 , 2 i i π = denote the 
payoffs accruing to the agents. Then, a FSR can be defined as: 
 
  ()() { } , ; , : 0, 0, 0, 0, 1,2, ij ij i j i j FSR h h h h i i j γγ γ γ ≡∈ ∈ > > > > = ≠      
 
where 
ii
ab
i γ ππ =−captures the positive difference between payoffs 
attainable in scenario A and in scenario B respectively. Of course, whenever 
ab
ii π π > agent iwould prefer scenario A to scenario B. Broadly interpreted, a 
FSR can be considered as a bargaining space. 
 
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows: in the first part, a basic 
partial equilibrium model of conflict is presented. In the second part, a 
basic model allowing for the second instrument is presented. The third part 
is focused on the issue of measurement. In particular, entropy is presented 
as an alternative tool to measure conflict and conflict management. In the 
following sections, a first extension will deal with (a) the existence of an 
unilateral concession leading to the establishing of a FSR; (b) the existence 
of an asymmetry in productive characteristics and its impact on the 
establishing a FSR. Finally, the last section summarises the results and 
provides suggestions for future research. 
   9
THE PURE CONFLICT MODEL 
 
Consider two risk-neutral agents, indexed by  2 1, = i , that are identical in 
abilities, but at the same time they have different evaluations of the stake in 
the conflict. Then, Let  ( ) 0, , 1,2 i xi ∈∞=  denote the stake of the conflict. 
Given the asymmetry in evaluation, it would be possible to write that 
12 x x ≠ where the subscripts indicate the evaluation of agent 1 and agent 2 
respectively. In particular, hereafter assume that agent 1 has a higher 
evaluation than agent 2, namely  12 x x > . Let  ( ) 1 0, ∈ δ  denote the degree of 
asymmetry between the stakes of the two agents, namely 
() 21 0,1 . . stx x δ δ ∃∈ = . For sake of notational simplicity, throughout the paper 
I shall use agent 1’s evaluation as a kind of numeraire and it will be simply 
denoted by x.There is common knowledge about such hypotheses. 
Under the assumption of risk-neutrality, agents interpret the 
outcome of the non-cooperative interaction as deterministic. That is, given 
the assumption of risk-neutrality, agents are indifferent between conflict 
and sharing a stake in accordance with the winning probabilities. Let 
() 2 , 1 , , 0 = ∞ ∈ i zi  denote the positive amount of ‘guns’ and  [ ) 2 , 1 , , 0 = ∞ ∈ i hi  
denote ‘talks’. 
As noted above, a partial equilibrium model of conflict with an 
exogenous prize is not technically distinguishable from the standard rent-
seeking model. The outcome of the conflict is determined through a CSF. 
The ratio form of the CSF used here is: 
 
i
i
ij
z
p
zz
=
+
   for  2 1, = i and  i j ≠      (1) 
 
Equation (1) is differentiable and follows the conditions below: 
 
12
22 22
33 33
1
/0 /0
/0 /0
/0 /0
ij ii
ij ii
ij ii
pp
pz pz
pz pz
pz pz
+= ⎧
⎪ ∂ ∂> ∂∂ > ⎪
⎨ ∂ ∂> ∂∂ < ⎪
⎪ ∂ ∂< ∂∂ > ⎩
      ( 1 . 1 )  
 
The functional form adopted in equation (1) implies that the conflict is not 
decisive, namely there is no preponderance of an agent over the other. This 
is of course a limiting assumption, even if many conflicts fall in this 
category. Under the assumption of risk-neutrality the outcome of the CSF 
denotes the proportion of appropriation going to agent ifor  2 , 1 = i . 
Eventually, the payoff function is given by: 
   10
() ,, 1 , 2 ,
pc i
ii j i i
ij
z
zz x zi i j
zz
π =− = ≠
+
     (2) 
 
Applying a maximization6 process, using  21 x x δ =  and suppressing 
subscripts for notational simplicity, the equilibrium choices of ‘guns’ 
(denoted by stars superscripted) are given by:  
 
() ()
2
**
12 22 ;
11
pc pc zx zx
δδ
δδ
==
++
      ( 3 )  
 
It is clear that 
**
12
pc pc zz >  and also that 
** /0 ,/0 , 1 , 2
pc pc
ii zx z i δ ∂∂ > ∂∂ > = . Note 
also that 
2*2
1 /0 ,
pc z δ ∂∂ < and 
2*2
2 /0
pc z δ ∂ ∂>⇔ 1/2 δ < .  
Eventually the payoffs are given by: 
 
() ()
3
**
12 22
1
;.
11
pc pc x x
δ
ππ
δδ
==
++
      ( 4 )  
 
Simple to verify that 
***
12 ,/ 0 , 1 , 2
pc pc pc
i xi πππ >∂∂ > = . Note also that 
*2 * 2
11 /0 , / 0
pc pc πδ π δ ∂∂ < ∂ ∂ > and 
*2 * 2
22 /0 ; / 0
pc pc πδ π δ ∂ ∂>∂ ∂ >.  
 
To sum up, both agents expend positive investments in ‘guns’ which are 
increasing in the evaluation of the stake. They both get positive payoffs and 
agent 1, namely the agent with a higher evaluation of the stake, is capable of 
getting a higher payoff by means of a higher level of ‘guns’. 
Figure 1 shows the relationship between the payoffs of both agents 
and the degree of asymmetry in the evaluation of the stake (with an 
arbitrary value  100 x = attached to the agent 1’s evaluation of the stake). As 
the asymmetry in evaluation decreases, the difference between the 
attainable payoffs decreases as well.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
6 The First Order Conditions and the Second Order Conditions are given by 
 
() ()
2
23 2
2
10 , 0 , 1 , 2 ,
pc pc
jj i ii
i
ii ij ij
zz x
x ii j
zz zz zz
ππ ∂∂
=− = = − < = ≠
∂∂ ++
   11
 
FIGURE 1. – PAYOFFS IN PURE CONFLICT 
 
 
 
INVESTING IN CONFLICT MANAGEMENT 
 
Consider now the option of a second instrument. Agents commit themselves 
to the use of a second instrument in order to affect the outcome of the 
contest. As mentioned above, the basic model presented hereafter follows 
and partly modifies the one proposed in Epstein and Hefeker (2003). The 
ordinary CSF is modified in order to allow for a second instrument. The two 
instruments are assumed to be complementary to each other. Then, the use 
of the second instrument would strengthen the effect of the first 
instrument. Eventually the CSF becomes: 
 
( )
() ()
1
,1 , 2 .
11
i
i cm i
ii j j
zh
p ii j
zh zh
+
== ≠
++ +
     ( 5 )  
 
and follows the conditions below: 
 
23
23
23
23
/0 /0 /0
/0 /0 /0
/0 /0 /0
/0 /0 /0
i
cm cm cm
ii ii ii
cm cm cm
ij ij ij
cm cm cm
ii i ii
cm cm cm
ij ij ij
pz pz pz
pz pz pz
ph ph ph
ph ph ph
⎧∂∂ >∂ ∂ <∂ ∂ >
⎪∂∂ < ∂ ∂ > ∂ ∂ < ⎪
⎨∂∂ >∂ ∂ <∂ ∂ > ⎪
⎪∂∂ < ∂ ∂ > ∂ ∂ < ⎩
   (5.1) 
 
and the other cross-partial derivatives with respect to  i x are given by: 
   12
2
2
2
00
00
00
cm
i
ii j j i j
ii
cm
i
ii j j i j
ij
cm
i
ii j j i j
ij
p
hz hz z z
zh
p
hz hz z z
zz
p
hz hz z z
zh
⎧∂
>⇔ − + − < ⎪
∂∂ ⎪
⎪∂ ⎪ >⇔ − + − > ⎨
∂∂ ⎪
⎪∂ ⎪ >⇔ − + − >
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      ( 5 . 2 )  
 
Eventually, assuming linear cost functions for both instruments the payoff 
function for each agent become: 
 
()
() () 11 22
1
,1 , 2 .
11
ii cm
ii i i
zh
xzh i
zh zh
π
+
=− − =
++ +
     (6) 
 
Also in this case, a Nash-Cournot behaviour for both agents is assumed. 
Therefore, each agent maximizes7 its own payoff. The optimal choices of 
‘guns’ and ‘talks’ are given by: 
 
() ()
() ()
δδ
δδ
δδ
δδ
⎧
== − ⎪
++ ⎪
⎪
⎨
⎪
⎪ == −
⎪ ++ ⎩
22
**
11 22 22
33
**
22 22 22
1
11
1
11
cm
cm
z xh x
z xh x
     (7) 
 
First, note that the agent with a higher evaluation of the stake arms more 
than the opponent (
**
12
cm cm zz > ). Moreover, it is also clear that 
** *
1 0, / 0, / 0; 1,2
cm cm cm
ii zz x z i δ >∂ ∂ >∂ ∂> = . That is, irreversible investments in 
‘guns’ of both agents are increasing in the value of the stake. At the same 
time, ‘guns’ are both decreasing in the asymmetry of evaluation, namely as 
the evaluations of the stake converge agents arm more. Whenever the 
degree of asymmetry is close to zero, the level of ‘guns’ is almost equal.  
                                                 
7 The first order conditions for maximization are: 
 
() ()
()
()
()
2
11
10
1
10
1, 2,
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i
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zz h
x
h hz hz z z
ii j
π
π
++ ∂
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∂ ++ +
+ ∂
=− =
∂ ++ +
=≠
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What about the optimal level of ‘talks’? First note that:  
 
() ( )
22 22
**
12 23
11
0; 0 hx hx
δδ
δδ
++
>⇔> >⇔>       (8) 
 
That is, in order to have a positive investment in ‘talks’ the value of the 
stake must be relatively large. Secondly, it is clear that agent 2 has a 
narrower range allowing for positive values of h. For example, for  100 x =  it 
is simple to verify that 
*
1 0. 1 h δ >⇔> whereas 
*
2 0. 2 2 h δ >⇔> . Moreover, it 
is clear that 
** /0 ; /0 , 1 , 2 ii hx h i δ ∂∂ > ∂∂ >=. Note in particular, that ‘talks’ are 
increasing in the degree of asymmetry. Another point of interest is that the 
difference of both instruments exactly equals. That is, in formal terms, 
** * *
121 2
cm cm zzh h −= − .  
  Eventually, in order to verify whether the critical points 
()
** * *
12 1 2 ,, ,
cm cm zzh h  represent a global maximum, it is possible to consider the 
Hessian matrices for both agents. In the appendix are reported the results. 
The analysis shows that ()
* ***
12 1 2 ,, ,
cm cm zzh h  does constitute only a local max. 
The payoffs in equilibrium are given by:  
 
()
()
2
*
1 2 2
1
1
1
cm x δ
π
δ
−
=+
+
       ( 9 . 1 )  
 
()
()
32
*
2 2 2
1
1
1
cm xδδ
π
δ
−
=+
+
     ( 9 . 2 )  
 
Given  () 1 , 0 ∈ δ , it would be simple to verify that 
**
12
cm cm π π > . Note also that 
*
1 /0
cm πδ ∂∂ < whilst 
*
2 /0 0 . 6 8
cm πδ δ ∂∂ > ⇔ > . Moreover, consider that agent 
1’s payoff is unambiguously larger than zero, (
*
1 0
cm π > ), whereas 
*5 4 3 2
2 02 1 0
cm xx πδ δ δ δ >⇔ + − + + >. Figure 2 clearly shows that there is a 
large range where agent 2’s payoffs turn negative.    14
 
FIGURE 2. – PAYOFFS IN CONFLICT MANAGEMENT 
 
In order to illustrate the impact of the second instrument on agents’ 
behaviour I apply a numerical example with an arbitrary value attached to 
the stake of the conflict, say  100 x = . Moreover, it is possible now to analyse 
by means of a standard comparative statics what would be the scenario 
chosen by agents comparing the attainable payoffs under pure conflict and 
under conflict management.  The results, as presented in Table 1, show that 
there is no room for a FSR. Agents will prefer pure conflict to conflict 
management. However, analysing the figures, some differences emerge that 
are worth mentioning: 
First, there is a range that I would define Conflict Trap. In such a 
situation no agent is willing to invest resources in ’talks’, namely 
**
12 0; 0 hh << . This emerges when the asymmetry in the evaluation of the 
stake is extremely large. Consider briefly that for  100 x = no agent is going to 
invest in ‘talks’ when 00 . 1 δ << . As previously indicated by inequalities (8) 
in order to have positive investments in ‘talks’ the value of the stake must be 
relatively large. The intuition behind is clear. Given the assumption of 
common knowledge, agent 1 is aware that agent 2 is not going to invest a 
massive amount of resources neither in ’guns’ nor in ’talks’.  
A second remarkable point refers to an asymmetry amongst the 
choices of agents. In particular agent 1 is willing to invest resources (
*
1 0 h > ) 
in the second instrument to manage the conflict. Instead agent 2 is not 
going to invest in talks, namely 
*
2 0 h < . This result also appears to be driven 
mainly by the evaluation of the stake. Given the asymmetry in the 
evaluation, agent 2 has clearly less incentives in expending positive 
investmens in ’talks’. 
A third point highlights positive investments of both agents in ‘talks’ 
but they are not able to attain higher payoffs than the pure conflict scenario. 
This could be defined as an Unfeasible Settlement Region (USR). To build 
an intuition upon this result, consider that investing  in both instruments is   15
costly. Then, even if agents have an incentive given by the value of the stake, 
the benefits of ‘talks’ do not outweigh the costs. 
 
 
TABLE 1. EFFORTS AND PAYOFFS  
                                   
x  δ  
*
1
cm z  
*
2
cm z  
*
1 h  
*
2 h  
*
1
pc π  
*
2
pc π  
*
1
cm π  
*
2
cm π  
**
11
cm pc π π −  
**
22
cm pc π π −  
100  0.05 0.25 0.01  -0.75  -0.99  90.70 0.01  100.25  0.99  9.55  0.98 
100 0.15  2.15  0.32  1.15  -0.68  75.61  0.26  94.50  0.68  18.88  0.43 
100  0.25  5.54 1.38 4.54 0.38  64.00 1.00 84.04  -0.30  20.04  -1.30 
100 0.35  9.72  3.40  8.72  2.40  54.87  2.35  70.64  -1.99  15.77  -4.34 
100 0.45  14.00  6.30  13.00  5.30  47.56  4.33  56.15 -4.03  8.59  -8.36 
100 0.55  17.83  9.81  16.83  8.81  41.62  6.93  42.11  -5.84  0.49  -12.77 
100 0.65  20.88  13.57  19.88  12.57  36.73  10.09  29.54 -6.84  -7.19  -16.92 
100 0.75  23.04  17.28  22.04  16.28  32.65  13.78  18.92  -6.56  -13.73  -20.34 
100 0.85  24.35  20.70  23.35  19.70  29.22 17.94  10.35  -4.74  -18.87  -22.69 
100 0.95  24.93  23.69  23.93  22.69  26.30  22.55  3.69  -1.31  -22.60  -23.86 
                                   
 
To sum up it is possible to write: 
 
PROPOSITION 1: When agents are asymmetric in their evaluation of the 
stake and identical in fighting abilities: (i) they prefer a pure conflict 
scenario; (ii) when the asymmetry in the evaluation of the stake  is 
extremely large a conflict trap emerges.     
 
 
MEASURING CONFLICT 
 
Conflict is susceptible to measurement. In the standard partial equilibrium 
contest theory the resources expended do constitute the social cost of 
contest. In rent-seeking literature it is defined as the Rent Dissipation. 
Then, recall the optimal choices of violent efforts. It would be possible to 
write that the total cost under pure conflict is given by: 
 
()
**
12 1
pc pc pc TC z z x
δ
δ
=+=
+
       ( 1 0 )  
 
Recalling (7) the total cost of contest when both agents expend efforts in a 
second instrument is given by: 
 
()
()
2
** **
11 22 2 2
1
21
1
cm cm cm T Czh zh x
δδ
δ
⎛⎞ + ⎜⎟ =+ ++ = −
⎜⎟ + ⎝⎠
    (11) 
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Define  () ( ) ( )
2 22 1/ 1 M δδ δ =+ + for compactness. Then, it is possible to write 
that 
cm pc TC TC >  for  ( ) 2/ x M > .  
  However, as noted by Epstein and Hefeker (2003) since agents 
evaluate the stake differently it is necessary to look at the relative rent 
dissipation (RRD). It is defined as follows: 
 
**
12
TC
RRD
p xpx δ
=
+
        ( 1 2 )  
 
Then in case of pure conflict the RRD is given by: 
 
2 1
pc RRD
δ
δ
=
+
        ( 1 3 )  
 
while in the case of CM would be given by: 
 
()
() ()
( )
()
2 2
23 3
1 1
2
11 1
cm RRD
x
δ δδ
δδ δ
⎡⎤ + +
⎢⎥ =−
++ + ⎢⎥ ⎣⎦
     ( 1 4 )  
 
Then it is possible to compare (13) and (14). The plot below scales the value 
of the stake against the level of asymmetry in evaluation.  
 
 
FIGURE 3. – RELATIVE RENT DISSIPATION IN PURE CONFLICT AND CONFLICT 
MANAGEMENT 
 
Therefore, analysing both RD and RRD it appears clear that a conflict with 
two instruments would be more detrimental for welfare and less efficient 
from an economic point of view than a conflict with only one instrument. 
Hence, establishing a FSR would be welfare-immiserizing. In such a narrow 
sense, however, a pure conflict scenario would be paradoxically preferable,   17
given that establishing a FSR would be less efficient than pure conflict. Of 
course, this kind of conclusion would be sensitive to the modelling adopted 
but such a ‘positive’ impact would not be theoretically excluded from the 
start. 
However, it is clear that such a measurement could be unsatisfactory 
to analyse the realm of conflicts. If efficiency were a criterium for policy 
decision no conflict would emerge. As a result, further analysis is necessary. 
It would also be reasonable to identify a complementary measure for 
conflict and conflict management. An appealing idea for a more useful 
evaluation can be related to those of disorder and randomness. In fact, 
since conflict is a destructive interaction between two or more parties, it 
seems reasonable to consider also the degree of uncertainty it spreads. In 
actual violent appropriative conflicts, uncertainty about the final outcome 
does clearly constitute a characteristic element that should be considered in 
developing devices to solve the conflict itself. 
The measure of uncertainty as the degree of disorder can be captured 
through the concept of entropy. In communication theory and physical 
sciences, entropy is commonly adopted as a measure of the degree of 
disorder, uncertainty or randomness in a system.8 The famous reference is 
the work of Shannon and Weaver (1949), which posed the quantitative 
foundations of information theory. In such a framework, entropy is defined 
as:  
 
1
1
( ,..., ) ln ,
n
ni i
i
Ep p k p p
=
=− ∑        ( 1 5 )  
 
where  k  is an arbitrary constant which can be set to unity without loss of 
generality.9 Note that, following the prevailing literature,  i p can be 
interpreted in two different ways. First, it can represent a probability. 
Secondly, it can represent a share of some total quantity. Then, this flexible 
interpretation does fit well with the assumption of risk-neutrality and the 
following properties of the CSF. 
The greatest disorder would occur when all outcomes have the same 
probability, i.e.  1/ i p n =  for  1,... in = . The degree of disorder is given by: 
(1/ ,...,1/ ) ln E nn k n = . For instance, in the limiting case of  2 n =  and  1 k =  the 
degree of disorder will be given by ln(2) E = . Then, consider the pure-conflict 
case when agents use only one instrument. Thus, in such a case it would be 
simple to demonstrate that entropy is given by: 
 
                                                 
8 Consider, among others, some applications of entropy to social sciences: the 
Nobel graduate in physic Dennis Gabor applied entropy to the measurement of 
social and economic freedom in Gabor and Gabor (1958). Entropy has also been 
proposed as a measure of competitiveness and diversification in market structure: 
see Attaran and Zwick (1989) and Horowitz and Horowitz (1968). 
9 The form adopted here is the one presented in Campiglio (1999), ch.4.   18
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Consider now the case of conflict management. In such a case the entropy is 
given by: 
 
() () () ( )
()
12
222
**
2
1l n 1 2 l n
,
1
cm Ep p
δ δδ δ
δ
++ −
=
+
     ( 1 7 )  
 
It would not be difficult to show that 
pc cm EE > for ( ) 0,1 δ ∈ . This means that 
in presence of efforts devoted to conflict management, the degree of 
disorder is lower. In particular, the point of interest is that as the 
asymmetry in evaluation decreases, the degree of disorder and turbulence 
increases. This point sheds further light upon the results of the foregoing 
sections. It has been showed that as the asymmetry decreases, agents have 
no longer incentives to invest in ‘talks’. Then, as the incentives to conflict 
increase, the degree of disorder increases. In particular, as the degree of 
asymmetry approaches the unity, the difference in the degree of disorder 
decreases. 
 
FIGURE 4. – ENTROPY IN PURE CONFLICT AND CONFLICT MANAGEMENT 
 
In order to refine the use of entropy for measurement of conflicts, it would 
also be useful to introduce the concept of relative entropy. Relative entropy 
is defined as the ratio of the actual to the maximum entropy in a system. 
Relative entropy does not give any information about the degree of disorder 
That is, it would be useful to recognize the extent to which the degree of 
disorder approaches the maximum level attainable. In formal terms it is 
possible to write the relative entropy as:  /( ) REE L n n = . Then, relative 
entropy for pure conflict and conflict management respectively will be: 
   19
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The relative entropy ratio would range from a value of zero for no entropy 
to a value of one when the maximum degree of entropy is attained.  
 
 
FIGURE 5. – RELATIVE ENTROPY IN PURE CONFLICT AND CONFLICT 
MANAGEMENT 
 
 
Table 2 presents the calculations for entropy and relative entropy 
respectively. 
 
Table 2. Entropy and Relative Entropy 
        
   Pure  Conflict  
Conflict 
Management 
Asymmetry in 
Evaluation   Entropy 
Relative 
Entropy  Entropy 
Relative 
Entropy 
        
0.05   0.19  0.28    0.02  0.03 
0.15   0.39  0.56    0.11  0.15 
0.25   0.50  0.72    0.22  0.32 
0.35   0.57  0.83    0.34  0.50 
0.45   0.62  0.89    0.45  0.65 
0.55   0.65  0.94  0.54  0.78 
0.65   0.67  0.97  0.61  0.88 
0.75   0.68  0.99    0.65  0.94 
0.85   0.69  1    0.68  0.98   20
0.95   0.69 1   0.69 1 
                    
 
The figures clearly show that entropy is lower in the presence of ‘talks’. At 
the same time, it is worth noting that whenever agents expend resources in 
conflict management, the system fails to achieve its maximum possible 
degree of entropy at a relatively lower rate. In sum, it would be possible to 
write: 
 
PROPOSITION 2: When agents are asymmetrical in their evaluation of the 
stake and identical in fighting abilities, the conflict management scenario 
appears to be less turbulent than the pure conflict scenario.  
 
Although entropy appears to be an appealing concept to evaluate conflicts 
and contests, some points should be highlighted. First, a remarkable point 
of interest which would deserve further attention is related exactly to the 
functional form of CSF adopted. In particular, if entropy is used as a 
measure of the degree of disorder, it would be clear that it will depend 
directly on (i) the technology of conflict; (ii) the number of contestants; (iii) 
the abilities of contestants; (iv) the existence of institutional constraints or 
noises. The result of this section also raises questions on the trade-off 
between efficiency losses and the degree of disorder. There could be 
equilibria where a lower degree of disorder could be attainable with a higher 
waste of resources. However, the social waste of resources is higher than in 
a pure conflict scenario. This simple consideration would represent a crucial 
point for a future research agenda. A trade-off between the loss of resources 
and the degree of turbulence could clearly emerge. 
 
A CONCESSION TO ESTABLISH  AN INTEGRATIVE RELATIONSHIP 
 
This section extends the basic model of conflict management in order to 
evaluate a concession made by agent 1, namely the agent with the higher 
evaluation of the stake. Making a concession falls in a broad sense in the 
category of integrative grants. The concept of integrative grant I apply does 
partly fit the idea of integrative relationship as developed and expounded by 
Boulding (1973). A grant is an unilateral transfer from an individual, a 
group or a social unit to another. In the simplest two-agents case, a grant 
provided by the first agent must enter the utility function of the second 
party. The recipient’s payoff function must be increasing in the grant. The 
peculiar feature of a grant is its unilateral commitment. As noted in the 
introduction, a concession chosen endogenously has to be considered self-
enforcing. In fact, in presence of an exogenously chosen concession an 
ordinary problem of cooperation and collective action emerges.10 
                                                 
10 in Caruso (2006b) I explored the ‘peaceful’ impact of an exogenous institutional 
constraint    21
A possible criticism is that only a unilateral concession is considered. 
In the study of conflict many would maintain that only reciprocal 
concessions are effective. The choice of considering only an unilateral 
concession is based upon the results of the foregoing sections which showed 
how, under some conditions, only one agent is willing to expend positive 
efforts in ‘talks’. The driving force in foregoing sections was the asymmetry 
in evaluation of the stake. Then I shall assume that agent 1, namely with a 
higher evaluation of the stake, is going to concede unilaterally to the 
opponent. This appear to be as a reasonable assumption given that in the 
presence of a relatively large asymmetry in the evaluation of the stake an 
asymmetrical willingness to manage the conflict emerges ( 12 0, 0 hh >< ). The 
concession has to be considered as an irrevocable self commitment which is 
unambiguously and perfectly observable and measurable. The rationale 
behind this self-commitment is to establish a FSR.  
Of course, it is questioned whether making the concession can 
modify the incentives to conflict management for both agents. Thus, 
through a positive transfer, agent 1 commits itself to influence the 
opponent’s behaviour. This influence is provided not only by means of 
coercion but through  an integrative approach. Essential to understand the 
impact of an integrative grant is the awareness that agents do not give up 
their rational and maximizing behaviour. They are still utility-maximizers 
and behave simultaneously à la Cournot. 
Another remarkable and potentially critical point is the assumption 
of simultaneity. In such a framework this assumption can be accepted 
mainly because of complete information. In fact, given the assumption of 
complete information, each agent’s payoff function is common knowledge 
among agents. Therefore, agent 2 knows what would be the maximum 
payoff going to agent 1 and then what would be its dominant strategy. 
Moreover, the level of asymmetry is also common knowledge. It is 
reasonable to think that if the complete information assumption is relaxed, 
a sequential protocol would fit much better the mechanism of making a 
concession. 
Then, suppose that such an integrative grant is worth a fraction of 
the optimal level of resources expended for conflict management. A simple 
example can be drawn from International Relations. States invest resources 
in military expenditures and diplomacy. This does clearly fit with the idea of 
‘guns’ and ‘talks’. Then take foreign aid. Foreign aid flowing from one state 
to another commonly falls within the budget of diplomacy. Through foreign 
aid, the donor state attempts to influence the behaviour of the recipient. In 
fact, although foreign aid is supposed to be a unilateral transfer provided to 
address issues of poverty and development, it is also designed to pursue 
foreign policy objectives of donor countries. 
Many other examples can be drawn form the real world, and some of 
them need not to indicate a benign or a desirable conduct. They can take the 
shape of extortion. Take a shopkeeper and a racketeer agent of a criminal 
organization. A shopkeeper opens a shop in an area where the criminal 
organization extracts rents from shopkeepers. The racketeer usually makes   22
money by means of credible threats of violence. The stake of the conflict is 
represented by the value of the shop managed by the shopkeeper. The value 
of the shop corresponds to the discounted value of future earnings. Taking 
into account also personal beliefs and perceptions, the shopkeeper attaches 
a higher evaluation to the stake of the conflict since he knows that the shop 
is worth his life’s work. The racketeer has a lower evaluation of the stake 
since it constitutes only one source of income among the shops available for 
racketeering. The shopkeeper anticipates the threat of the racketeer and will 
acquiesce to the extortion. He will concede a positive fraction of his future 
income. Then, in such a case the concession takes the shape of extortion. 
To sum up, a concession – interpreted as an unilateral transfer from 
agent 1 to agent 2 – will enter additively the payoff function of agent 2. Then 
let  ( ) 0,1 σ ∈ the fraction of ‘talks’ devoted to making the concession. While 
choosing the optimal level of ‘talks’ agent 1 will choose also the level of the 
concession given the value of such a fraction. Of course, whenever 
1 σ = agent 1 commit itself to concede the entire amount of resources 
expended in ‘talks’. In its general form, the payoff function for agent i  
become  ( ) 1212 ,,,, ,
cc
ii zzhhx π πσ = .Then it is possible to write: 
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after the ordinary process of maximization the optimal choices of both 
agents are: 
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Note that 
* 0, 1,2
c
i zi >= but also that: 
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First, it is clear that 
**
12
cc zz > . Instead  ( )
**
12 1/ 1
cc hh δ σ >⇔ < +. Plotting this 
inequality in the parameter space ( ) , δ σ  makes clear that  as the concession 
becomes larger and larger ( ) 1 σ → and  the asymmetry in the evaluation 
decreases ( 1 δ → ) agent 2 will expend more resources in ‘talks’ than its 
opponent.   
 
 
FIGURE 6 . – COMPARISON OF INVESTMENTS IN TALKS IN PRESENCE OF A 
CONCESSION 
 
Another interesting comparison that can be made is that with optimal 
choices of ‘guns’ in the ‘pure conflict’ scenario. Recalling (3) it would be 
possible to verify that: 
 
() () ()
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3
111
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that is, optimal choices of ‘guns’ in the presence of a unilateral concession 
are not always lower than optimal choices under ‘pure conflict’. Eventually, 
the attainable payoffs are given by: 
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I t  i s  p o s s i b l e  t o  s h o w  t h a t  
*
1 /0
c πσ ∂ ∂<11, 
*
1 /0
c πδ ∂ ∂< and that 
*2
1 /0 1 / ( 1 )
c x π δσ ∂∂ > ⇔ <+ . It is more interesting to note the behaviour of 
agent 2’s payoffs. First, agent’s payoffs are increasing in the value of the 
stake only for specific combination of the parameters. That is, 
()()
2 *3
2 /0 1 1 0
c x πδ σ δ σ σ ∂∂ > ⇔ +−+ + > . Moreover, how do agent 2’ payoffs 
change as δ  is varied? Agent 2’s payoff are increasing in δ  if and only if 
() () ()()
32 *532
2 /0 1 6 1 2 1 3 1 2 0
c πδ δ σ δ σ δ σσδσσ ∂ ∂ > ⇔ + + + − +− ++> .  
 
Table 3 - Payoffs and FSR in presence of Concession ( 100; 0.5 x σ = = ) 
x   σ   δ  
*
1
pc π  
*
2
pc π  
*
1
cm z  
*
2
cm z  
*
1
cm h  
*
2
cm h  
*
1
pc π  
*
2
cm π  
**
11
cm pc π π −  
**
22
cm pc π π −   FSR 
100 0.5 0.05  90.70  0.01  0.37 0.02 -0.75 -0.98 100.38  0.61  9.68  0.59  ○ 
100 0.5 0.15  75.61  0.26  3.16  0.47 1.11 -0.53 91.92 1.09  16.30  0.84  ○ 
100 0.5  0.2  69.44  0.56  5.34  1.07 2.56 0.07  85.16  1.28  15.72  0.72  ● 
100 0.5 0.21  68.30  0.63  5.82  1.22 2.88 0.22  83.66  1.30  15.35  0.67  ● 
100 0.5 0.22  67.19  0.72  6.31  1.39  3.21 0.39  82.11  1.32  14.92  0.60  ● 
100 0.5 0.23  66.10  0.80  6.81  1.57 3.54 0.57 80.53 1.33  14.43  0.52  ● 
100 0.5 0.24  65.04  0.90  7.32  1.76 3.88 0.76  78.91  1.34  13.87  0.44  ● 
100 0.5 0.25  64.00  1.00  7.84  1.96 4.22 0.96  77.26  1.34  13.26  0.34  ● 
100 0.5 0.26  62.99  1.11  8.36  2.17  4.57  1.17  75.58  1.33  12.59  0.23  ● 
100  0.5  0.27 62.00  1.22  8.89  2.40  4.92  1.40 73.87 1.33  11.87  0.10  ● 
100 0.5 0.35  54.87  2.35  13.11 4.59 7.74 3.59 59.75  1.12  4.88  -1.23  ○ 
100 0.5 0.45  47.56  4.33  17.87 8.04 10.91 7.04  42.46  0.86  -5.10  -3.48  ○ 
100 0.5 0.55  41.62  6.93  21.47 11.81 13.31 10.81  27.35  1.21  -14.28  -5.72  ○ 
100 0.5 0.65  36.73  10.09  23.74  15.43  14.83  14.43 15.22  2.76  -21.51  -7.33  ○ 
100 0.5 0.75  32.65  13.78  24.82  18.62  15.55  17.62  6.10  5.86  -26.56  -7.91  ○ 
100 0.5 0.85  29.22  17.94  24.96  21.22  15.64  20.22 -0.43 10.60  -29.65  -7.35  ○ 
100 0.5 0.95  26.30  22.55  24.44  23.21  15.29  22.21 -4.89 16.86  -31.18  -5.69  ○ 
 
 
To give some indication of the significance of the results, table 3 offers a 
numerical example. As before, I set the value of the stake equal to one 
hundred ( 100 x = ) and I also use  0.5 σ = to indicate the fraction of positive 
investments in ‘talks’ devoted to make a concession. That is, imagine that a 
government sets the amount of foreign aid as the half of total budget for 
diplomacy. The results show that a FSR is achievable in presence of a large 
asymmetry in the evaluation of the stake. In particular, under the arbitrary 
values chosen, a FSR is achievable if and only if 0.2 0.27 δ ≤ ≤ . This seems to 
imply that in order to reach an agreement two agents – risk-neutral and 
identical in abilities – have to adequately differ in evaluation. At the same 
time, they must not differ too much. In fact, when the asymmetry is 
extremely large (namely as  0 δ → ), they have no incentive in investing in 
‘talks’. Even in the presence of a concession they are willing to be involved 
                                                 
11 It would be possible to show that 
*
1 /0
c πσ ∂ ∂> when δ  is slightly larger than 
zero. However,  as the value of  x increases agent 1’s payoffs are no longer 
increasing in σ .   25
in pure conflict. I labeled this scenario as Conflict Trap. As the degree of 
asymmetry decreases ( 1 δ → ) there is no room for a FSR. Agents fall again 
in the Unfeasible Settlement Region USR and they prefer a Pure Conflict 
scenario. Then, in order to have a FSR the actual degree of asymmetry δ  
must fall within a range  , δ δ ⎡⎤ ⎣⎦  . 
 
 
FIGURE 7 – FSR IN THE PRESENCE OF CONCESSION 
 
 
Given the analytical complexity I skip all the formulas I present the 
FSR in the figure 7 The FSR is presented in the parameter space ( ) , δ σ  for 
100 x = . The area ABCD is the FSR. In fact, consider the curves  1, 2, 3 aaa. 
All the points on the left of  1 a curve respect the inequality 
**
11
c pc π π >  whereas 
all the points on the left of  2 a follows the inequality 
**
22
cp c π π > .  
In order to better assess the results of the analysis I let the σ  vary 
and I also set a higher value for the value of the stake ( 1000 x = ). The table 
below shows that as the arbitrary value attached to the stake becomes larger 
the FSR enlarges. However, it is interesting to note that it enlarges shifting 
to a lower degree of δ . Consider in particular the case for  0.5 σ = . Setting 
1000 x =  the upper bound of a FSR shifts to 0.23 and the lower bound goes 
down to 0.09, (0.09 0.23 δ ≤≤ ). To sum up, as the value of the stake 
increases it is necessary to have a larger asymmetry to achieve a FSR. Note 
also that in both cases considered as the fraction approaches the unity 
( 1 σ → ) the FSR shrinks.  
 
Table 4 – FSR and Concession 
σ  FSR  ( 100 x = ) FSR  ( 1000 x = ) 
0.1 No  No 
0.15 No 0.1≤ δ ≤0.11 
0.2  δ =0.21 0.1≤ δ ≤0.12 
0.25  δ =0.21 0.1≤ δ ≤0.14   26
0.3  0.21≤ δ ≤0.22 0.1≤ δ ≤0.16 
0.35  0.21≤ δ ≤0.24 0.1≤ δ ≤0.17 
0.4  0.2≤ δ ≤0.25 0.1≤ δ ≤0.19 
0.45  0.2≤ δ ≤0.26 0.09≤ δ ≤0.21 
0.5  0.2≤ δ ≤0.27 0.09≤ δ ≤0.23 
0.55  0.2≤ δ ≤0.29 0.09≤ δ ≤0.25 
0.6  0.2≤ δ ≤0.3 0.09≤ δ ≤0.27 
0.65  0.19≤ δ ≤0.32 0.09≤ δ ≤0.29 
0.7  0.19≤ δ ≤0.34 0.09≤ δ ≤0.32 
0.75  0.19≤ δ ≤0.35 0.09≤ δ ≤0.33 
0.8  0.19≤ δ 0.34 0.09≤ δ ≤0.32 
0.85  0.19≤ δ ≤0.33 0.09≤ δ ≤0.32 
0.9  0.19≤ δ ≤0.32 0.09≤ δ ≤0.31 
0.95  0.18≤ δ ≤0.32 0.09≤ δ ≤0.3 
 
 
PROPOSITION  3:  When agents are identical in fighting abilities and 
asymmetrical in the evaluation of the stake a FSR can be established if and 
only if: (i) the agent with the higher evaluation of the stake provides the 
opponent with a positive concession which is assumed to be proportional 
to the level of investment in talks; (ii) the agents are sufficiently 
asymmetric in the evaluation of the stake. Namely, the actual degree of 
asymmetry must fall within a range  , δ δ ⎡ ⎤
⎣ ⎦  that is increasing in value of 
the stake.  
 
As measurement of this scenario it is possible now to consider the relative 
entropy in the presence of a concession. It is given by: 
 
() () () () ( ) ( ) ( )
() ()
22 2 2
2
11 l n 111 l n 1
11 l n ( 2 )
c RE
δ σδ σ δ σ δ σ
δσ
++ ++ − + +
=
++
   (25) 
 
The Figure 8 shows how the proportional concession can have an impact on 
the level of relative entropy. It is interesting to note that, as the proportional 
concession increases, the level of entropy is higher. This happens whenever 
a relative large asymmetry exists. Consider that it has been shown that as 
1 δ →  a FSR cannot be established. In such a case, making a concession 
would be useless and the scenario would become more turbulent. At the 
same time, making a larger concession appears to be more turbulent. This is 
also clear, given that agent 1 is a rational utility-maximizer involved in a 
non-cooperative environment it would prefer a small concession to a large 
concession. 
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FIGURE 8. - RELATIVE ENTROPY IN THE PRESENCE OF AN UNILATERAL 
CONCESSION 
It is possible to compare the level of relative entropy in the presence of 
concession ( 0.5 σ = ) with the level of relative entropy in pure conflict. 
Figure 9 unambiguously shows that relative entropy is lower in the presence 
of concession.  
 
 
FIGURE 9. – RELATIVE ENTROPY IN THE PRESENCE OF AN UNILATERAL 
CONCESSION AND FSR 
 
 
Proposition 4: When agents are asymmetrical in their evaluation of the 
stake and identical in fighting abilities: (i) the conflict management 
scenario in the presence of a concession appears to be less turbulent  than 
the pure conflict scenario; (ii) the greater is the concession the more 
turbulent appears to be the conflict management scenario.  
 
 
CONFLICT MANAGEMENT AND RETURNS TO SCALE 
 
In the foregoing sections, I have assumed that agents retain different 
evaluations of the contested stake. In particular, it has been showed that the 
asymmetry in evaluation is a powerful force driving choices of agents.   28
However, I gave no explanation about the source of such asymmetry. In this 
section I shall try to provide a very simple tentative explanation for this. 
The basic assumption here is that agents are heterogeneous in production 
functions. Furthermore, agents compete for the appropriation a factor of 
production. Then, the stake of the conflict is the represented by an input as 
it enters a production function.    
Historical and anecdotal narratives of territorial disputes provide 
plenty of examples in this respect. In ancient times, competition between 
farmers and gatherers can be interpreted along this view. Furthermore, take 
a potential conflict between an oil company and farmers over the 
exploitation of soil. Oil production exhibits increasing returns to scale while 
traditional agricultural productions exhibit decreasing returns to scale. 
Consider also the famous current dispute over the shrimps aquaculture in 
the subtropical coastal lowlands in America and Asia. Apart from 
environmental and social considerations it can be examined according to 
this view. In fact, shrimp farming can exhibit economies of scale whilst the 
traditional displaced productions as salt-flats, coastal fishing and 
agriculture exhibit decreasing returns to scale. 
Then, productive characteristics can play a role. Dacey (1992/1996) 
pointed out how the existence of specific productive characteristics deserves 
a deep attention because they can have on impact on the level of hostility. 
In this respect, this section is intended to take into account the 
productive characteristics of a factor of production. In particular, I try to 
analyse the relationship between the incentives to conflict and to negotiate  
and the existence of returns to scale for the stake of the conflict. The role of 
returns to scale is highly relevant, but hard to pin down. The economic 
literature on conflict commonly disregards the importance of returns to 
scale. The prevailing literature focuses mainly on the technology of conflict 
leading to different non-cooperative results. 12 What I want to maintain here 
is that agents look at the stake of the conflict taking into account the 
technical properties of their production processes. Agents attach to the 
value of the stake the technical properties of the production function. This 
also implies that, under the assumption of common knowledge, while 
appropriating a positive fraction of a contestable input each agent does take 
into account its own production function as well as that of its opponent. 
Then, only for expository needs, hereafter imagine agents exhibiting 
heterogeneous production functions as: () 1 ;0 , yx
α α = ∈∞ , 
() 2 ;0 , yx
β β =∈ ∞ where  12 , yy denote the level of production of agent 1 and 2 
respectively. The exponents  , α β  denote the degrees of returns to scale for 
agent 1 and 2 respectively. Both functions are standard single-stage 
production functions where the final output is a function of the flow of a 
single input denoted by  x which does constitute the stake of the conflict. 
                                                 
12 To my knowledge, a first attempt is Hirshleifer (1995), that deals with the 
existence of returns to scale through attaching a productivity parameter to a 
contestable income. However, it does not affect the result of the conflict.   29
Therefore, for α β ≠ it is clear that x x
αβ ≠ . For sake of simplicity assume 
that  α β > . Of course, within this simple setting, it is clear that agents 
retain a different evaluations of the contested stake. In its general form, the 
payoffs function for agent i become  ( ) 12 ,, ,, ; 1 , 2
rs rs
ii zzx i ππ α β == . Then it is 
possible to write: 
 
12
11 22
12 12
;
rs rs zz
x zx z
zz zz
αβ ππ =− =−
++
      ( 2 6 )  
 
Following an ordinary process of maximization13 the optimal choices of 
‘guns’ are given by: 
 
() ()
22
**
12 22 ;.
rs rs xx
zz
xx xx
αβ α β
αβ αβ
++
==
++
       ( 2 7 )  
 
Under the assumption of α β > , it would be possible to say that 
**
12 1
rs rs zz x >⇔ > . Moreover, 
*
1 /0 1
rs zx α ∂ ∂>⇔> .  
 
The payoffs accruing to the agents are: 
 
() ()
33
**
12 22 ;.
rs rs xx
xx xx
αβ
αβ αβ ππ ==
++
     ( 2 8 )  
 
Given α β >  it is clear that 
**
12
rs rs π π > . To better assess the results consider a 
very simple numerical example. For  100, 1.2, 1 x α β = ==  the payoffs 
accruing to the agents are  1
**
2 128.5, 8.1
rs rs ππ == . The 3D plot depicts both 
agents’ payoffs.  
 
                                                 
13 The First Order Conditions for the maximization problem are:  
 
() ()
12 21
12 22
12 12 12
0; 0
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xz xz
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αβ ππ ∂∂
=− = =− =
∂∂ ++
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FIGURE 10. – PAYOFFS IN THE PRESENCE OF RETURNS TO SCALE ( 100 x = ). 
 
 
Consider now the option for the second instrument in the presence of a 
concession. Of course for  0 σ = there is no concession. The payoff functions 
become: 
 
11
11 1 1
11 22
(1 )
(1 ) (1 )
rsc zh
x zh h
zh zh
α π σ
+
=− − −
++ +
      ( 2 9 . 1 )  
22
22 2 1
11 22
(1 )
(1 ) (1 )
β π σ
+
= −−+
++ +
rsc zh
x zh h
zh zh
    ( 2 9 . 2 )  
 
Following an ordinary maximization process the optimal choices of both 
agents are given by: 
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The payoffs are given by: 
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Also in this case, consider a simple numerical example. For 
100, 0.5, 1.2, 1 x σ αβ === = the payoffs accruing to the agents are 
**
12 126.48, 1.66 ππ ==
rsc rsc .  The 3D plot depicts both agents’ payoffs (plot with 
panels indicate agent 1’s payoffs) with  100, 0.5 x σ = = . Analyzing the plot, it 
appears clear that there are combinations of α and  β  that push agent 1’s 
payoffs down to the negative range.  
 
 
FIGURE 11 – PAYOFFS IN THE PRESENCE OF RETURNS TO SCALE AND A 
CONCESSION,  =100 x ,  0.5 σ =  
 
In order to verify whether a FSR is attainable in the presence of a 
concession, I present first two plots and then a numerical example whose 
results are reported in the tables below. 
  What about the establishing of a FSR? Consider first the case of no 
concession  0 σ = with  100 x = . For sake of simplicity I set  χ αβ = − to denote 
the difference in the aggregate degrees o f  r e t u r n s  t o  s c a l e .  U n d e r  t h e  
assumption  α β > the difference χ  is unambiguously larger than zero. The 
FSR is the area delimited by ABC. First when  0 χ ≅ it is clear that no FSR 
can be attainable.  At the same time, Figure 12 shows how a FSR can be 
reached when agents’ aggregate degrees of returns to scale are sufficiently 
asymmetric.  
  Consider for example first the case of agent 1 exhibiting constant 
returns to scale 1 α = . In such a case to have a FSR it is necessary to have the   32
difference between α and  β falling within a range whose bounds are given 
by .369, .494 χχ    . It would be the same to say that β must fall within a 
range whose bounds are given by:  .506; .631 ββ    . 
  Take agent 1 exhibiting decreasing returns to scale, say  0.85 α = , In 
such a case to have a FSR it is necessary to have the difference between 
α and  β falling within a range whose bounds are given by .313, .420 χχ    . 
The aggregate degree of returns to scale of agent 2 β must fall within a 
range whose bounds are given by:  .43; .537 ββ    . 
 
 
FIGURE 12 – FSR IN PRESENCE OF RETURNS TO SCALE ( 100 x = ) 
 
Then, differently from the foregoing section, while considering productive 
characteristics a FSR is attainable even if a concession is not ensured. Then, 
consider now the emergence of a concession. Figure 13 shows the FSR in 
the presence of returns to scale and concession with arbitrary values set at 
100 x = and  0.5 σ = .  
  Consider again the case of agent 1 exhibiting constant returns to 
scale. In such a case to have a FSR it is necessary to have the difference 
between  α and  β falling within a range whose bounds are given 
by .278, .496
c c χχ    . It would be the same to say that β must fall within a 
range whose bounds are given by:  .504; .722
c c ββ    . (the superscript 
denotes ‘concession’). Now consider again of agent 1 exhibiting decreasing 
returns to scale  0.85 α = . In such a case the bounds for  χ  are given by: 
.254, .418
c c χχ    . Hence for β it is possible to write  .432; .596
c c ββ    .  
  To sum up briefly, it is clear that by means of a concession agent 1 is 
able to enlarge the FSR. 
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FIGURE 13 – FSR IN THE PRESENCE OF RETURNS TO SCALE AND CONCESSION 
( 100, 0.5 x σ = = ) 
 
However, knowing that making a concession enlarges the FSR is not a 
shocking result. To assess and deepen better the results consider now the 
tables below. I set some arbitrary values for the β , I let vary α choosing 
values under the condition α β > . Then, different values of a proportional 
concession are presented. The emergence of a FSR is denoted by bold 
symbols. Agents choose the ‘conflict management ‘ scenario.  Otherwise 
there is a persistence of a pure conflict scenario.  
The first table presents the case of agent 2 exhibiting decreasing 
returns to scale ( .5 β = ). The news here is that when both agents exhibit 
decreasing returns to scale the concession must be relatively large. That is, 
in the presence of small proportional concession the FSR is only slightly 
larger than one attainable without concession. Whenever agent 1 exhibits 
increasing returns to scale it is clear that even a small proportional 
concession appears to be effective in enlarging the FSR. In particular, when 
both agents exhibit increasing returns to scale a small concession appears to 
be more effective. Of course, it is still the asymmetry in the productive 
characteristics to lead towards the establishing of a FSR.  
 
Table 5.1 -  100; 0.5 x β = =  
α      σ=0  σ=0.05  σ=0.15  σ=0.25  σ=0.40  σ=0.55  σ=0.7  σ=0.85  σ=1 
               
0.55   ○  ○  ○  ○  ○  ○  ○  ○  ○ 
0.6   ○  ○  ○  ○  ○  ○  ○  ○  ○ 
0.65   ○  ○  ○  ○  ○  ○  ○  ○  ○ 
0.7   ○  ○  ○  ○  ○  ○  ○  ○  ○ 
0.75   ○  ○  ○  ○  ●  ●  ●  ●  ● 
0.8   ●  ●  ●  ●  ●  ●  ●  ●  ● 
0.85   ●  ●  ●  ●  ●  ●  ●  ●  ● 
0.9   ●  ●  ●  ●  ●  ●  ●  ●  ●   34
0.95   ●  ●  ●  ●  ●  ●  ●  ●  ● 
1   ○  ○  ○  ○  ○  ○  ○  ○  ○ 
1.05   ○  ○  ○  ○  ○  ○  ○  ○  ○ 
1.1   ○  ○  ○  ○  ○  ○  ○  ○  ○ 
1.15   ○  ○  ○  ○  ○  ○  ○  ○  ○ 
1.2   ○  ○  ○  ○  ○  ○  ○  ○  ○ 
1.25   ○  ○  ○  ○  ○  ○  ○  ○  ○ 
1.3   ○  ○  ○  ○  ○  ○  ○  ○  ○ 
1.35   ○  ○  ○  ○  ○  ○  ○  ○  ○ 
1.4   ○  ○  ○  ○  ○  ○  ○  ○  ○ 
1.45   ○  ○  ○  ○  ○  ○  ○  ○  ○ 
1.5   ○  ○  ○  ○  ○  ○  ○  ○  ○ 
1.55   ○  ○  ○  ○  ○  ○  ○  ○  ○ 
1.6   ○  ○  ○  ○  ○  ○  ○  ○  ○ 
                                
 
 
Table 5.2 - x=100. b=0.75 
α      σ=0  σ=0.05  σ=0.15  σ=0.25  σ=0.40  σ=0.55  σ=0.7  σ=0.85  σ=1 
               
0.8   ○  ○  ○  ○  ○  ○  ○  ○  ○ 
0.85   ○  ○  ○  ○  ○  ○  ○  ○  ○ 
0.9   ○  ○  ○  ○  ○  ○  ○  ○  ○ 
0.95   ○  ○  ○  ○  ○  ○  ○  ○  ○ 
1   ○  ○  ○  ○  ○  ○  ●  ●  ○ 
1.05   ○  ○  ○  ○  ○  ●  ●  ●  ● 
1.1   ○  ○  ○  ○  ●  ●  ●  ●  ● 
1.15   ○  ○  ●  ●  ●  ●  ●  ●  ● 
1.2   ●  ●  ●  ●  ●  ●  ●  ●  ● 
1.25   ●  ●  ●  ●  ●  ●  ●  ●  ● 
1.3   ●  ●  ●  ●  ●  ●  ●  ●  ● 
1.35   ●  ●  ●  ●  ●  ●  ●  ●  ● 
1.4   ●  ●  ●  ●  ●  ●  ●  ●  ● 
1.45   ●  ●  ●  ●  ●  ●  ●  ●  ● 
1.5   ○  ○  ○  ○  ○  ○  ○  ○  ○ 
1.55   ○  ○  ○  ○  ○  ○  ○  ○  ○ 
1.6   ○  ○  ○  ○  ○  ○  ○  ○  ○ 
1.65   ○  ○  ○  ○  ○  ○  ○  ○  ○ 
1.7   ○  ○  ○  ○  ○  ○  ○  ○  ○ 
1.75   ○  ○  ○  ○  ○  ○  ○  ○  ○ 
1.8   ○  ○  ○  ○  ○  ○  ○  ○  ○ 
1.85   ○  ○  ○  ○  ○  ○  ○  ○  ○ 
                                
 
 
Table 5.3 - 100; 1 x β = =  
α      σ=0  σ=0.05  σ=0.15  σ=0.25  σ=0.40  σ=0.55  σ=0.7  σ=0.85  σ=1 
               
1.05   ○  ○  ○  ○  ○  ○  ○  ○  ○   35
1.1   ○  ○  ○  ○  ○  ○  ○  ○  ○ 
1.15   ○  ○  ○  ○  ○  ○  ○  ○  ○ 
1.2   ○  ○  ○  ○  ○  ○  ○  ○  ○ 
1.25   ○  ○  ○  ○  ○  ○  ●  ●  ○ 
1.3   ○  ○  ○  ○  ○  ●  ●  ●  ● 
1.35   ○  ○  ○  ○  ●  ●  ●  ●  ● 
1.4   ○  ○  ○  ○  ●  ●  ●  ●  ● 
1.45   ○  ○  ○  ●  ●  ●  ●  ●  ● 
1.5   ○  ○  ●  ●  ●  ●  ●  ●  ● 
1.55   ○  ●  ●  ●  ●  ●  ●  ●  ● 
1.6   ●  ●  ●  ●  ●  ●  ●  ●  ● 
1.65   ●  ●  ●  ●  ●  ●  ●  ●  ● 
1.7   ●  ●  ●  ●  ●  ●  ●  ●  ● 
1.75   ●  ●  ●  ●  ●  ●  ●  ●  ● 
1.8   ●  ●  ●  ●  ●  ●  ●  ●  ● 
1.85   ●  ●  ●  ●  ●  ●  ●  ●  ● 
1.9   ●  ●  ●  ●  ●  ●  ●  ●  ● 
1.95   ●  ●  ●  ●  ●  ●  ●  ●  ● 
2   ○  ○  ○  ○  ○  ○  ○  ○  ○ 
2.05   ○  ○  ○  ○  ○  ○  ○  ○  ○ 
2.1   ○  ○  ○  ○  ○  ○  ○  ○  ○ 
                                
 
Table 5.4 -  100; 1.25 x β = =  
α      σ=0  σ=0.05  σ=0.15  σ=0.25  σ=0.40  σ=0.55  σ=0.7  σ=0.85  σ=1 
               
1.3   ○  ○  ○  ○  ○  ○  ○  ○  ○ 
1.35   ○  ○  ○  ○  ○  ○  ○  ○  ○ 
1.4   ○  ○  ○  ○  ○  ○  ○  ○  ○ 
1.45   ○  ○  ○  ○  ○  ○  ○  ○  ○ 
1.5   ○  ○  ○  ○  ○  ○  ●  ●  ○ 
1.55   ○  ○  ○  ○  ○  ●  ●  ●  ● 
1.6   ○  ○  ○  ○  ○  ●  ●  ●  ● 
1.65   ○  ○  ○  ○  ●  ●  ●  ●  ● 
1.7   ○  ○  ○  ●  ●  ●  ●  ●  ● 
1.75   ○  ○  ○  ●  ●  ●  ●  ●  ● 
1.8   ○  ○  ●  ●  ●  ●  ●  ●  ● 
1.85   ○  ○  ●  ●  ●  ●  ●  ●  ● 
1.9   ○  ●  ●  ●  ●  ●  ●  ●  ● 
1.95   ●  ●  ●  ●  ●  ●  ●  ●  ● 
2   ●  ●  ●  ●  ●  ●  ●  ●  ● 
2.05   ●  ●  ●  ●  ●  ●  ●  ●  ● 
2.1   ●  ●  ●  ●  ●  ●  ●  ●  ● 
2.15   ●  ●  ●  ●  ●  ●  ●  ●  ● 
2.2   ●  ●  ●  ●  ●  ●  ●  ●  ● 
2.25   ●  ●  ●  ●  ●  ●  ●  ●  ● 
2.3   ●  ●  ●  ●  ●  ●  ●  ●  ● 
2.35   ●  ●  ●  ●  ●  ●  ●  ●  ● 
2.4   ●  ●  ●  ●  ●  ●  ●  ●  ● 
2.45   ●  ●  ●  ●  ●  ●  ●  ●  ●   36
2.5  ○  ○  ○  ○  ○  ○  ○  ○  ○  ○ 
                                
 
PROPOSITION 5 –When agents are asymmetrical in productive 
characteristics, namely in the degree of return to scale, and identical in 
fighting abilities (i) there is room for establishing a FSR- agents would 
choose the ‘conflict management scenario - if agents are also sufficiently 
asymmetric in their productive characteristics; (ii) an unilateral 
concession can enlarge the FSR; (iii) a proportional concession is more 
effective when both agents exhibit increasing returns to scale.  
 
  It is possible now to compute the level of relative entropy in both 
scenarios. The relative entropy attainable in a pure conflict scenario is given 
by: 
 
()
11
ln ln( ) ln ln( )
ln(2)
pc
x xx x
xx xx
RE
xx
αβ
αβ αβ
αβ
αβ
⎛⎞ ⎛⎞ ⎛⎞ ⎛⎞ ++ + ⎜⎟ ⎜⎟ ⎜⎟ ⎜⎟ ++ ⎝⎠ ⎝⎠ ⎝⎠ ⎝⎠ =−
+
 (32) 
 
whilst the relative entropy in presence of CM and a proportional concession 
is given by: 
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(33) 
 
The results are illustrated in the plots below. I set different values for the 
proportional concession. The plots below offer a comparison of attainable 
levels of relative entropy for  100 x =  and alternatively 
0.25; 0.5; 0.75; 1 σ σσ σ == == . 
  The plots clearly show that relative entropy in conflict management 
is lower than in pure conflict. It is also interesting to note that when agents 
exhibit the same degree of returns to scale (α β = ) the entropy reach its 
maximum level. Interpreting  entropy as a measure of degree of turbulence, 
a confirmation of previous results emerges. That is, when there is no 
asymmetry between agents the degree of turbulence is higher.   37
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FIGURE 14 – RELATIVE ENTROPY IN THE PRESENCE OF RETURNS TO SCALE 
AND CONCESSION 
 
   
CONCLUDING REMARKS  
 
This paper analysed the incentives for risk-neutral agents to invest in 
conflict management in a conflict under different conditions. Through 
comparative statics, different scenarios have been studied. A Feasible 
Settlement Region (FSR) has been defined as the set of all possible 
settlement points. The key elements of the paper are: (i) an asymmetry in 
the evaluation of the stake; (ii) the existence of a transfer (concession) from 
one agent to the other. The main results are summarised below: 
 
a) In the presence of agents with identical abilities and different 
evaluations of the stake, whenever the evaluations are sufficiently 
asymmetric, a FSR can be established if and only if the agent with the 
higher evaluation of the stake is willing to make a proportional concession 
to the opponent; 
b) If the concession enters additively the payoff function of the 
recipient, both parties can be better off if the degree of asymmetry falls 
within a range  , δ δ ⎡⎤ ⎣⎦ . The existence of greater concessions expands the 
range of δ for which a FSR can be established; 
c) As the evaluations of the stake converge, namely for  1 δ → , a FSR 
is no longer attainable; 
d) When the evaluations are extremely asymmetric, namely for 
0 δ → , a FSR cannot be attained even if a concession is ensured. Call this 
Conflict Trap. 
 
These results show that an asymmetry in evaluation of the stake paves the 
way for ‘cooperation’ in a non-cooperative environment. Asymmetry in the 
evaluation can be translated in ‘asymmetry in incentives’. The other   39
remarkable point is that whenever the asymmetry is extremely large, a 
conflict trap emerges. In other words – roughly speaking -  agents have to 
be asymmetric but not too much. This result rests to a large extent upon the 
assumption of complete information. In fact, under complete information 
agent 1 knows perfectly that the investments in pure violence made by agent 
2 will be negligible. The Pure conflict scenario will be the preferred option. 
Taking into account productive characteristics of both agents sheds 
further light on the foregoing results. Of course, the contested stake has to 
be considered as a factor of production. It is differently evaluated because 
agents retain different productive characteristics captured through the idea 
of returns of scale. Recall that agent 1 is assumed to be more productive 
than agent 2. Putting bad news first, the main results are: 
 
e) when agents are equal in productive characteristics there is no 
room for a FSR.  
f) When agents are sufficiently asymmetric in the degree of returns to 
scale, a FSR is attainable; 
g) Enlarging the FSR is possible through an unilateral concession 
provided by the most productive agent.  
h) A concession appears to be more effective when both agents   
exhibit increasing returns to scale. 
  
Broadly interpreted, this results suggest that an improvement in 
technology can favour an agreement between conflicting parties if the more 
productive agent provide an adequate compensation to the less productive 
agent. At the same time, being more productive make agents less prone to 
conflict.  
The results of the paper can be also considered as a contribution to 
the study of self-enforcing arrangements. By means of a credible self-
imposed concession, agent 1 is able to influence agent 2’s behaviour. The 
FSR has been considered as a credible and incentive-compatible structure. 
Credibility has been assumed to be related to the cost of conflict 
management. Since efforts in conflict management – ‘talks’ - are costly and 
total outlays are irreversible, they are supposed to be credible. It is clear 
that the impact of credibility is strongly sensitive to the assumption of 
perfect information. This is the rationale behind the search for solutions 
involving only positive investments in conflict management, namely 
( 0; 1,2 i hi >=). 
However, the critical issue is the stability of such a solution. In 
reality, cheating does always constitute an option for participants. In this 
respect, it is significant that – formally speaking – the optimal choices in 
the ‘conflict management’ scenario do not constitute a global max. They do 
only constitute a local max. However, given the analytical complexity 
further investigation is needed on this point. 
The integrative mechanism can also have another ambiguous impact. 
Under the hypothesis of common knowledge, agent 2, the recipient of the 
concession, can have an incentive to behave strategically: agent 2, albeit   40
favouring a settlement, may be tempted to work against it expecting to get a 
monetary transfer. A classical problem of moral hazard can emerge.      
As a novelty of this work, I would also quote the use of the concept of 
entropy as a tool for measurement of conflict. Following the common 
neoclassical approach, investing in conflict management would be welfare-
immiserizing. In such a narrow sense, however, a pure conflict would be 
preferable to a scenario where agents invest resources in conflict 
management. Establishing a FSR would be less efficient than pure conflict. 
An appealing idea for a more useful evaluation can be related to those of 
disorder and randomness. In fact, since conflict is a destructive interaction 
between two or more parties, it seems  reasonable to consider the degree of 
uncertainty it spreads. In actual violent appropriative conflicts, uncertainty 
about the final outcome does clearly constitute a characteristic element that 
should be considered while developing policies to solve the conflict itself. It 
has been shown that the level of entropy also depends on the level of the 
asymmetry in the evaluation of the stake. In particular, the point of interest 
is that as the asymmetry in evaluation decreases, the degree of disorder and 
turbulence increases. In particular, in presence of efforts devoted to conflict 
management, the degree of disorder is lower. Furthermore, an interesting 
point which emerged is that the greater is the concession the higher is the 
level of relative entropy. These results are confirmed when productive 
characteristics are assumed to be the source of the asymmetry. 
The discussion related to the concept of entropy recalls the debate, 
famous among students of International Relations during the Cold War, 
about the stability of systems grounded on deterrence. In such a view, 
deterrence would be a stable system thanks to the existence of a credible 
threat. The results of this paper firmly contrasts this idea. A threat system 
(namely the ‘pure conflict’ scenario) is more turbulent than the ‘conflict 
management’ scenario. However, future research on this point could 
contribute to this enduring debate. 
The analysis paves the way for several extensions. In particular, 
remarkable points deserving further extension are the impact of a larger 
time horizon and the setting of a learning process. The model expounded in 
this work is a timeless model. Nevertheless, consider a possible application 
to a multi-period interaction. Assume for example that a dynamic 
interaction involves a learning process. Then imagine that such a learning 
process can modify the asymmetry in evaluation. Consider for example that 
evaluations of the stake converge over time. Furthermore, you can also 
imagine that some peculiar features of agents modify (consider among 
others: production function, access to market, investment in new 
technologies etc). In such a case, in a future period (say tn + ), the 
asymmetry in evaluation can decrease, namely  tn t δ δ + > . In such a case, 
according to the results of the model, a settlement could be no longer 
possible. Parties could prefer a pure conflict. Broadly speaking, a superior 
information can have an ambiguous impact. 
Moreover, for a future research agenda, consider that the CSF is used 
as a fundamental building block of several broader models. Applying the   41
crucial modification of the CSF allowing for a second instrument can have 
an impact on the results emerging from these analyses. 
Last but not least, what I would also claim as a point of interest is the 
relationship of ‘conflict’ with ‘bargaining’. The results of the model show 
that conflict can evolve in a bargaining situation. It does if – and only if – 
some conditions are fulfilled. In other words, bargaining cannot be taken 
for granted. This, of course, has notable implications while designing 
policies and mechanisms to manage and solve conflicts.    
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APPENDIX 
 
Throughout this appendix I shall check whether the critical points for a 
maximum computed constitute a global max, namely a NE. Thus, I have to 
check whether  ( ) ( ) ( )
**** * *
1121 2 11212 11 ,,, ,,, , , zzhh zzh h zh A ππ ≥∀ ∈  and 
( ) () ()
11
**** * *
212 12 2 2 2 22 ,,, ,,, , , zzhh zzhh zh A ππ ≥∀ ∈ . 
  In order to check where the candidate critical points 
()
* ***
12 1 2 ,, ,
cm cm zzh h represent a maximum it is useful to compute the Hessian 
matrices for both agents. Let me denote  ,1 , 2 .
cm
ii zzi == for notational 
simplicity. First, I compute the payoff function for agent 1  ()
**
11 122 ,,, zhzh π . 
The payoff function becomes: 
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And the Hessian matrix is given by: 
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Note that the Hessian matrix is symmetric. Let  1k H denote the  th k order 
leading principal submatrix of  ( )
**
11 2 12 ,, ,
cm cm Hz z hh for  1, 2 k = . The determinant 
of the kth order leading principal minor of  ( )
**
11 2 12 ,, ,
cm cm Hz z hh is denoted by 
1k H . The leading principal minors alternate signs as follows: 
 
() ()
11
6 2 8642
12 1 1
0,
03 4 6 4 1 1 0 . δδ δ δ δ
<
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H
Hx z h
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Then I compute the payoff function for agent 2  ( )
11
**
22 2 ,,, zhzh π ,   43
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And the Hessian matrix is given by: 
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 Also in this case, let  2k H denote the  th k order leading principal submatrix of 
()
**
11 2 12 ,, ,
cm cm Hz z hh for  1, 2 k = . The determinant of the kth order leading 
principal minor of  ()
**
21 2 12 ,, ,
cm cm Hz zh h is denoted by  2k H . The leading 
principal minors alternate in sign as follows: 
 
() ()
21
4 42 2
22 2 2
0,
03 1 1 0 . δδ
<
⎡⎤ >⇔ − + + < ⎢⎥ ⎣⎦
H
Hx z h
     (9.5) 
 
since the Hessian matrices are not negative semidefinite it is necessary to 
deepen the analysis in order to show whether the critical points 
()
* ***
12 1 2 ,, ,
cm cm zzh h  represent a global max. Then I compute the limits of both 
agents’ payoffs. For the first agent we have: 
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I do the same for agent 2. 
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therefore for both agents it is still necessary to check for  0, 1,2 i hi ==. 
Consider first the payoff function of agent 1: 
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the payoff is: 
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then, compare (9.1) and (9.11): 
 
 
() ()
()
()
()
2 22 3 1 / 2 4 2
22 24 2
11 2 1
12 1
δδ δ δ δ
δδ δ
+− − −− −
>
++ +
x xx
      ( 9 . 1 2 )  
 
Due to the analytical complexity I present a plot in a ( ) , δ x space. The vertical 
axe corresponds to  1 δ = . The shaded area in the plot below shows the region 
where the critical points ()
* ***
12 1 2 ,, ,
cm cm zzh h represent an optimum. 
 
 
 
for agent 2 we have: 
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compare (9.16) and (9.2) 
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also in this case consider the plot below: 
 
 
 
 
Then, it is clear that the critical points ( )
* ***
12 1 2 ,, ,
cm cm zzh h
do not constitute a 
global maximum, namely a Nash Equilibrium (NE). 
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